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Abstract 
In the past decade, constructivist understandings of migration have gained 
momentum in migration studies. Scholars have shown how (some) people 
are enacted as ›migrants‹ when human mobility clashes with nation-states’ 
claimed prerogative to control »the legitimate means of movement« (Torpey). 
Another body of scholarship has highlighted the crucial role played by 
knowledge practices in the enactment of migration as an intelligible object of 
government. However, these two lines of inquiry have largely been conduct-
ed independently of each other. To better account for how practices of border 
control affect the production of knowledge about migration and how the 
latter, in turn, informs practices and rationales of migration management, 
this article asks: How can we conceptualize and empirically investigate the 
relationship between enacting migration through knowledge practices and 
enacting migrants through practices of bordering? In response to this ques-
tion, I propose a sociology of translation and treason in the tradition of the 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which enables tracing how records produced 
in border encounters are translated into not only ›migration facts‹ but also 
various forms of nonknowledge. To demonstrate the analytical potential of 
this approach, I show how statistical knowledge about the ›deportation gap‹ 
– often invoked to justify ever-more restrictive measures in the field of return 
policy – is, to a significant extent, a result of the mistranslation of returned 
migrants in administrative records used for migration statistics. 
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Zur Politik des (Nicht-)Wissens in der Herstellung/ 
dem Rückgängigmachen von Migration 
Zusammenfassung 
In den letzten Jahren haben konstruktivistische Ansätze in der Migrations-
forschung an Bedeutung gewonnen. Zahlreiche Forscher*innen haben ge-
zeigt, wie einige Subjekte zu Migranten gemacht werden, wenn Mobilität mit 
dem von Nationalstaaten beanspruchten Recht kollidiert, »die legitimen 
Mittel der Bewegung« (Torpey) zu kontrollieren. Ein zweiter Forschungsbe-
reich hat die Rolle von Wissenspraktiken bei der Konstitution von Migration 
als einem Objekt des Regierens aufgezeigt. Bislang wurden diese beiden 
Forschungsrichtungen zumeist unabhängig voneinander betrieben. Um bes-
ser zu verstehen, wie Praktiken der Grenzkontrolle die Produktion von Wis-
sen über Migration beeinflussen, und wie Letztere Praktiken und Logiken 
des Grenz- und Migrationsmanagements prägt, fragt dieser Artikel: Wie lässt 
sich die Beziehung zwischen der Konstituierung von Migration als einem 
Objekt des Regierens durch Wissensproduktion und die Konstitution von 
Migrant*innen durch Praktiken der Grenzkontrolle theoretisch denken und 
empirisch erforschen? Hierfür wird eine Soziologie der Übersetzung und des 
Betrugs in Tradition der Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie (ANT) vorgeschlagen. 
Dieser Ansatz erlaubt es zu untersuchen, wie administrative Daten, die Be-
gegnungen zwischen mobilen Subjekten und Akteuren der Grenzkontrolle 
generiert werden, in Fakten bzw. in Nicht-Wissen über Migration übersetzt 
werden. Um das analytische Potenzial dieses Ansatzes zu demonstrieren, 
zeige ich, wie statistisches Wissen über den ›deportation gap‹, der häufig 
bemüht wird, um restriktivere Maßnahmen im Bereich der Rückkehrpolitik 
zu legitimieren, zu einem signifikanten Teil auf der Nicht-Übersetzung von 
remigierten Migrant*innen in administrative Daten beruht, die für die Pro-




1  I would like to thank Delf Rothe, Jochen Oltmer as well as the anonymous reviewers of 
the Journal of Migration Studies for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
Earlier versions were presented at the workshop ›The Production of Knowledge about 
Migration‹ at the Institute of Migration and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) of the University of 
Osnabrück in November 2019 and at the Annual Meeting of the Section for International 
Relations of the German Association for Political Science in October 2020. I would like to 
thank the organizers and participants of both events for these opportunities to present and 
discuss work in progress. All errors and shortcomings remain mine. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, migration has featured prominently on the political 
agenda in Europe and beyond. How many people immigrate in a given year 
and the question of how to regulate migration can decide elections or even 
shape the future of the European Union (EU), as recently demonstrated by 
the vote for Brexit in the UK (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017). In spite of the 
ongoing politicization of migration, the knowledge practices that are mobi-
lized to constitute migrations as intelligible and actionable objects of policy-
making and government interventions have received little scholarly attention 
thus far.2 This relative neglect is surprising, considering the intensification of 
related efforts by state actors, think tanks, NGOs, activist networks, and oth-
er stakeholders in the contested policy arena of migration governance. Such 
migration-related knowledge practices include migration statistics, their 
circulation in graphs and charts, the registration of migrants in increasingly 
interconnected databases, projections of future migration flows, and the vis-
ualization of migration routes used by illegalized migrants, such as in the 
infamous i-Map of the International Centre for Migration Policy Develop-
ment (ICMPD) (see Figure 1). The practices also include the production of 
›counter knowledge‹ (Braun et al. 2018) by critical NGOs, scholars, and activ-
ist networks, such as the documentation of push-backs and border violence 
(e.g., Heller and Pezzani 2014), statistics on migrants who have died on their 
way to Europe (e.g., Last et al. 2017), a critique of the dominant production of 
images about migration (e.g., Hess 2012), and attempts of ›counter-mapping‹ 
(e.g., Casas-Cortes and Cobarrubias 2018).  
These contested politics of knowledge production are animated, on the 
one hand, by the mantra of evidence-based policymaking in the field of mi-
gration management (e.g., ICMPD 2013) and related calls for better data for 
better policy (e.g., Willekens et al. 2016). On the other hand, critical scholars, 
NGOs, and activists assume that the production of knowledge about migra-
–––––––––––– 
2  Of course, some notable exceptions to this observation exist. Recent publications include 
a special issue on the role of data practices in the enactment of migration (Scheel et al. 2019) 
and another one in the journal movements – Journal for Critical Border and Migration Studies on 
›contested knowledge production about migration‹ (Braun et al. 2018). 
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tion informs not only related political debates and strategies of government 
but also our very understanding of what migration is.3 »[F]rom an epistemic 
point of view, migration does not exist independently of the concepts, defini-
tions, methods, statistics, visualizations and various other data practices that 
are mobilized to produce knowledge on migration for the purposes of its 
›management‹« (Scheel et al. 2019, p. 579). Instead, migration is an abstrac-
tion that refers to the decisions, practices, and movements of scores of people 
who move and crisscross national dividing lines in various ways and for 
various reasons and timespans. Thus, migration is not a reality ›out there‹ to 
which policymakers and other stakeholders in the contested politics of bor-
der and migration management have direct access; rather, what is known, 
negotiated, and targeted as migration is mediated by a plethora of 
knowledge practices that rely on various information technologies, inscrip-
tion devices, definitions, bodies of expertise, categorizations, and so forth.  
The crucial point is that different knowledge practices – that is, different 
methods of knowing migration – will enact different versions of migration, 
which will in turn affect the calculations and interventions of government 
that are mobilized to regulate migration. Statisticians have also observed that 
knowledge practices perform the object to which they refer in particular 
ways, as the following quote illustrates: »In many countries, the definition of 
migration is determined by the way migration is measured« (Willekens 1994, 
p. 8). This illustrates that the »politics of international migration manage-
ment« (Geiger and Pécoud 2010) do not only take place at the offices of the 
European Commission (EC) in Brussels, the headquarters of the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) in Geneva, or the conference of Germany’s 
ministers of interior: they also happen at universities, statistical offices, think 
tanks, research departments of border agencies, and all other sites where 
knowledge about migration is produced. Therefore – and this is one of the 
article’s central arguments – the politics of international migration manage-
ment are intertwined with a politics of (non)knowledge that shape not only 
the calculations and practices of contemporary border and migration man-




3  For instance, the Network for Critical Migration and Border Regime Research (kritnet.org), 
founded in 2008, has been promoting an alternative mode of knowledge production on 
migration for over a decade. It endorses »the right to migration and escape […] as the cen-
tral epistemic and political maxim« for research (Kasparek and Hess 2010, p. 13) and seeks 
to counter the multifarious entanglements of academic knowledge production with the 
actors, methods, and rationales of border and mobility control (cf. kritnet.org).  
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Source: ICMPD.  
 
To better account for the performativity of knowledge practices and their 
implications for the practices and logics of border and migration manage-
ment, this article develops a conceptual framework and a related research 
agenda that revolves around what I call the politics of (non)knowledge in the 
(un)making of migration. In brief, this line of research is concerned with two 
interrelated questions: first, how migration is enacted as an intelligible object 
of government through the production of knowledge as well as various types 
of nonknowledge; second, how these various and sometimes conflicting en-
actments of migration inform and shape migration-related policies, logics, 
and practices of government. In conceptual terms, the article mobilizes two 
approaches from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), albeit in 
modified form. For the first approach, the article draws on material-semiotic 
approaches and the notion of enactment to account for the performativity of 
knowledge practices and practices of bordering (Law 2009; Mol 2002). It 
complements this approach with insights from agnotology (Proctor 2008) and 
the sociology of ignorance (Gross and McGoey 2015b) to examine how the 
production and circulation of various types of nonknowledge – such as 
doubt, uncertainty, »strategic unknowns« (McGoey 2012), secrecy (Walters 
2020), or »undone science« (Hess 2015) – feature in the enactment of migra-
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tion as an intelligible object of government. For the second approach, the 
article mobilizes a sociology of translation (Callon 1986b) in the tradition of 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to trace how administrative records as well as 
instances of non-recording are converted, via a chain of translations and 
modifications, into ›facts‹ about migration. I complement this second ap-
proach with a vocabulary of treason (Galis and Lee 2014), to better account 
for instances of betrayal, struggle, subversion, mistranslation, and so forth. 
This is particularly relevant in the context of border and migration manage-
ment, where the production, processing, and circulation of administrative 
records and knowledge for purposes of regulation and control are not always 
in the interest of the people who are enacted and targeted as migrants.  
To develop this analytical framework, the article engages with a question 
that is raised when one confronts the performativity of knowledge practices 
with a »relational understanding« (Mecheril et al. 2013, p. 7) of migration, as 
is promoted by critical and reflexive migration studies (e.g., Amelina 2020; 
Bojadžijev and Römhild 2014; Casas-Cortes et al. 2015; Dahinden 2016; Favell 
2007; Karakayali and Rigo 2010; Nieswand and Drotbohm 2014; Scheel 2013; 
Schwenken 2018; Tazzioli 2020). In this perspective, migration and the bor-
dering practices of nation-states are co-constitutive. To establish and repro-
duce itself as a (bounded) people, territory, and jurisdiction, the nation-state 
constantly draws and polices clear-cut demarcation lines between those who 
belong to the national citizenry and those who do not (Favell 2007; Sayad 
2004). Nicholas De Genova aptly summarizes this observation as follows: »it 
is the bordered definition of state territoriality that constitutes particular 
forms and expressions of human mobility as ›migration‹ and classifies specif-
ic kinds of people who move as ›migrants‹. Borders make migrants« (De Geno-
va 2015, p. 4; emphasis in original). 
Such an understanding of migration raises an important question for any 
inquiry into the politics of (non)knowledge in the (un)making of migration: if 
knowledge practices enact migration as an intelligible object of government, 
and bordering practices of nation-states enact (some) people as migrants, 
how we can theorize and study the relationship between the two? Address-
ing this question is important because it enables teasing out how practices of 
bordering and migration management affect the production of (non)knowl-
edge about migration and how the latter, in turn, shapes the strategies and 
practices of government aimed at the regulation and control of migration. 
To engage with this question, this article proceeds in four sections. First, I 
explain how the notion of enactment introduces a praxeological, material-
semiotic approach that allows us to study borders and migration as co-consti-
tutive, relational phenomena. The first section focuses on the enactment of 
migration through the production of (non)knowledge, while the second sec-
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tion attends to the enactment of migrants through practices of bordering. The 
third section introduces a sociology of translation and treason as a viable 
approach to theorizing the relationship between the enactment of migration 
as an intelligible object of government through knowledge practices and the 
enactment of people as migrants through practices of bordering. The fourth 
section illustrates the analytical potential of this approach, showing how the 
so-called »deportation gap« (Gibney and Hansen 2003) – the discrepancy 
between the number of people issued with a deportation order and the num-
ber of people who are actually deported or voluntarily leave – is, to a signifi-
cant extent, the result of a mistranslation of returned migrants into adminis-
trative records used for migration statistics. 
2 Migration and the Production of (Non)Knowledge 
Nation-states’ attempts to control and regulate cross-border mobility are 
heavily intertwined with knowledge production about migration. The impe-
tus of nation-states to regulate human mobility stems from several interrelat-
ed factors, including the need to create a legible population (Scott 1999), the 
»discovery« of the population as a source of wealth (Foucault 2007), and the 
conception of the authorization to »control the legitimate means of move-
ment« (Torpey 1998) as a marker of the sovereignty of the modern nation-
state. Since governing hinges on knowing what is to be regulated, the state’s 
impetus to control and regulate human mobility has fueled an unquenchable 
thirst for knowledge about human mobility and particularly cross-border 
mobility, understood as migration (cf. Braun et al. 2018; Garelli and Tazzioli 
2013; Stierl 2020). 
Two sets of knowledge practices seem to be particularly important to en-
acting migration as an intelligible object of government: quantification prac-
tices (especially statistics represented in charts and graphs) and practices of 
visualization (often resulting in maps depicting stocks and flows of migrants) 
(Casas-Cortes and Cobarrubias 2018; Methmann and Rothe 2014; Scheel and 
Ustek-Spilda 2019; Schwenken 2018; Takle 2017; Tazzioli and Walters 2016; 
Van Reekum and Schinkel 2017). Other scholars have highlighted the im-
portance of the categories used to classify migrants (e.g., Dahinden et al. 
2020; Grommé and Scheel 2020; Horvath 2019; Supik and Spielhaus 2019; 
Stricker 2019) and the discursive formations constituting migration as a prob-
lem of government. For instance, members of the research group Transit Mi-
gration have shown how refugee protection and anti-trafficking discourses 
victimize certain migrants as a way to justify border controls as means of 
serving as their protection (Hess and Karakayali 2007; cf. Andrijasevic 2007; 
Scheel and Ratfisch 2014). The notion of the migration regime highlights the 
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co-constitution of particular forms and types of migration and the attempts 
of governments to control and regulate them (Hess and Karakayali 2007). 
Thus, the notion of the migration regime implies an expansion of the analyti-
cal focus, from the study of ›migrants‹ or ›migration‹, understood as readily-
available objects of research, to the study of the »production of migration« 
(Pott et al. 2018, p. 6) – that is, the discourses, practices of bordering, laws, 
citizenship regimes, knowledge practices, architectural sites, infrastructures, 
and more through which some people are enacted as migrants. In this vein, 
dominant categorizations of migration policy discourse – such as ›guest 
worker‹, ›(bogus) asylum seeker‹, or ›illegal migrant‹ – are understood as 
expressions of particular relations of migration and related configurations of 
migration policy, rather than as descriptors of particular groups of migrants 
sharing distinct features (Karakayali and Rigo 2010). 
Despite this impressive, constantly-growing body of scholarship, many 
works in migration studies – and, to a certain extent, critical and reflexive 
migration studies as well – still entertain either a realist or a representational-
ist ontology, both of which assume an external migration-reality that pre-
exists the methods, devices, and practices used to know it. A realist ontology 
suggests that this external migration-reality is more or less accurately repre-
sented by knowledge practices like statistics or particular categorizations of 
migratory movements, thereby reducing criticism of knowledge production 
about migration to debates on accuracy and adequacy. Social constructivists, 
for their part, often embrace an epistemological relativism, assuming that 
different discourses, theoretical perspectives, and other practices of meaning-
making create different regimes of truth about the same phenomenon. The 
problem with these ontologies is that they do not account for the performa-
tivity of knowledge practices and of related political implications. Conse-
quently, the potential of these scholars to criticize knowledge practices is 
either limited to questions of accuracy and adequacy (realism) or to analyses 
questioning the power effects of hegemonic discourses (representationalism), 
which are often dismissed as equally interested, power-laden practices of 
meaning-making (cf. Breeze 2011; Hammersley 2003). 
Material-semiotic approaches and the related notion of enactment offer a 
solution to this conundrum. What is key to material-semiotic approaches is 
that they focus the analysis on practices that are conceived as sociotechnical, 
relational, and performative (Law 2009). The reason for this analytical focus 
on practices is that material-semiotic approaches do not assume pre-existing 
entities as the starting points of research; rather, they start from the premise 
that realities are the effect of complex, fragile sociotechnical networks and 
that these realities only hold as long as the webs of relations that bring them 
into being »are enacted, enacted again, and enacted yet again—which may or 
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not may happen in practice« (Law 2008, p. 635). Instead of different perspec-
tives, more-or-less accurate measurements, or adequate representations of an 
already-existing migration reality ›out there‹, the politics of knowing migra-
tion thus become a question of what Annemarie Mol (2002, p. viii) calls »on-
tological politics« – that is, a question of how, – and through what kind of 
knowledge practices, – migration-related realities are enacted as objects of 
government. If we focus on knowledge practices as primary research objects, 
we learn that different knowledge practices enact different versions of the 
real (Law 2004). Thus, reality becomes multiple –, or as Annemarie Mol 
(2002, p. 55) puts it, »more than on – but less than many« – as the identity of 
objects is conceptualized as fragile and mutable (Mol 2002, p. 43). The key 
point is that if reality is multiple and contested, then reality, along with the 
practices enacting it, become highly political, since »ontological multiplicity 
lays bare […] the permanent possibility of alternative configurations« (Mol 
2002, p. 164). 
Thus, the notion of enactment »allow[s] objects and subjects to change 
over time, enable[s] their identities to be fragile and allow[s] them to differ 
from site to site« (Ruppert 2011, p. 223). With this emphasis, the term enacting 
differs from alternative notions like ›producing‹, ›constructing‹, or ›constitut-
ing‹. To say that migration is ›constituted‹ through knowledge practices sug-
gests a one-time creational act that brings migration into being as an object of 
government; in contrast, to say that migration is enacted through knowledge 
practices suggests a reiterative process through which migration comes to 
exist –, but only as long as the web of practices, artefacts, and devices holds. 
To say migration is ›produced‹ or ›constructed‹ suggests that migration, or 
migrants, are the outcomes of practices of intentional human subjects who act 
according to a predefined plan. Likewise, the framing of migration as ›per-
formed‹ suggests (as in Goffmann’s sociology of the everyday) a performance 
on the front-stage according to a pre-written script, with a back-stage to 
which only the performers and critical sociologists and psychologists have 
access (Mol 2002, p. 35). The notion of enactment, a word »without too much 
academic history« (Mol 2002, p. 33), has been introduced precisely to avoid 
such connotations; in particular, it highlights the material and technical di-
mensions of the practices through which migration is done, dimensions that 
often escape and betray the intentions of willful human subjects (cf. Scheel et 
al. 2019). As a result, the enactment of migration as an intelligible object of 
government emerges as a fragile accomplishment that is facilitated by com-
plex, always-shifting associations comprising both human and non-human 
elements. In this way, the notion of enactment invites scholars to attend to 
the activities and »techniques that make things visible, audible, tangible, 
knowable« (Mol 2002, p. 33). 
48 ― Stephan Scheel 
ZMF 2021 1 (2): 39–71. 
Another important dimension of my understanding of the politics of 
(non)knowledge in the (un)making of migration is that the production of 
different forms of nonknowledge is just as crucial in the enactment of reali-
ties as the production of knowledge. In this regard, I enrich material-semiotic 
approaches with insights and concepts from the sociology of ignorance 
(Gross and McGoey 2015b) and agnotology (Proctor 2008). This growing field 
of research is not only concerned with classical questions of epistemology 
such as asking how we generate knowledge, what qualifies knowledge as 
scientific or credible knowledge, and what kind of effects this knowledge has: 
scholars of agnotology and ignorance also ask what we do not know, why we 
do not know it, how this nonknowledge is produced and sustained, and 
what kind of effects different types of nonknowledge have (Proctor 2008). 
Importantly, nonknowledge is not simply conceptualized as the negative of 
knowledge; rather, nonknowledge– just like knowledge – must be actively 
produced, and various types of nonknowledge exist, such as uncertainty, 
doubt, secrecy, or »undone science« (Hess 2015). Moreover, the relationship 
between knowledge and nonknowledge is not understood in terms of a zero-
sum game. Instead, nonknowledge is often intertwined with the production 
of knowledge, as nonknowledge is also thought of as productive (Gross and 
McGoey 2015a). The crucial point for the following analysis is that the pro-
duction of nonknowledge also shapes how migration is enacted as an object 
of government.  
How the productions of knowledge and nonknowledge intersect can be 
illustrated through previous study of a data visualization tool created by the 
IOM. The Global Migration Flows Interactive App (GMFIA) was supposed to 
make information on ›migration in the world‹ available to a wider public. 
Although it was deactivated in 2019, the GMFIA continues to offer an em-
blematic example of how statistical data on migration is taken up and used in 
the field of migration management. The design and set-up of the GMFIA 
resembles that of similar visualization tools for migration developed by other 
stakeholders in the field of migration management, such as FRONTEX’s an-
nual Risk Analyses Reports4, UNHCR’s Interactive Dataviz5, or the IOM’s 
–––––––––––– 
4  FRONTEX is the acronym of the European border protection agency. It has been active 
since 2004. Since 2010, the agency has published several ›risk analyses‹ per year that are full 
of graphs and maps visualizing seemingly-exact figures about ›apprehended migrants‹, 
›illegal border crossings‹, and so forth. For an overview of these reports see: https://frontex.
europa.eu/publications/?category=riskanalysis. Accessed: 11.2.2020. 
5  On UNHCR’s webpage, the Dataviz is described as »an archive of interactive data visual-
ization products created using various different technologies and software«. These data 
visualizations provide precise figures on statistical topics related to forced migration, such 
as the number of new asylum applications in particular regions or »first instance Decision 
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more recent Flow Monitoring app6. Until its deactivation, the GMFIA held a 
very prominent position on the IOM’s homepage and was ranked as the first 
link of any search engine query for ›world migration‹ or ›migration in the 
world‹. 
Figure 2: Interface of the GMFIA, showing immigration to the United 
Kingdom 
 
Screenshot of GMFIA taken by the author. Source: https://www.iom.int/world-migration. 
Accessed: 9.10.2017. 
 
At first glance, the GMFIA shows a conventional geopolitical map of the 
world (see Figure 2).7 When a particular country is selected, the quantity and 
composition of in- and outward migration to or from that country appear on 
the screen. If inward migration to the UK is clicked, a circle of colored clus-
ters emerges, with each cluster visualizing the number of immigrants from 
another country. If one of the colored clusters is hovered over, the respective 
country of origin is highlighted in the same color, and the number of immi-
grants from that country is displayed. For instance, the circles show that in 
2017, 703,050 migrants from Poland and 9,361 migrants from Estonia resided 
––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Trends«. To access these visualization visit: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/dataviz. Accessed: 
11.2.2020. 
6  The Flow Monitoring app provides seemingly-exact figures for the number of newly-
arrived migrants in Europe, disaggregated by year and migration route. Numbers are 
displayed in boxes that pop up if the user clicks on a particular migration route: 
https://migration.iom.int/europe?type=arrivals. Accessed: 11.2.2020. 
7  The GMFIA can still be accessed via the internet archive, which is why the following 
analysis is written in present tense: https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://www.iom.int/
world-migration. Accessed: 11.12.2019. 
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in the UK. As can be seen, the GMFIA provides very exact, perfectly match-
ing figures about the migration flows between different countries. The main 
effect of these seemingly-exact and perfectly-matching figures is that migra-
tion is enacted as a reality that can be managed, because it can be precisely 
known and quantified (Scheel and Ustek-Spilda 2019). In this way, the 
GMFIA supports one of the central epistemic cornerstones of the migration 
management paradigm (Scheel and Ustek-Spilda 2019) that has been pro-
moted by the IOM since the 1980s (Georgi 2010). However, this enactment of 
migration as a precisely quantifiable and therefore manageable reality is only 
possible with the production of nonknowledge about the known limits of 
quantifying migration (cf. Scheel and Ustek-Spilda 2019). 
While this nonknowledge is produced through several practices, space 
constraints only allow me to describe the data practice of omission. One im-
portant limitation of migration statistics that is omitted by the GMFIA is the 
known divergence between reported emigration and immigration events. As 
explained above, the GMFIA provides perfectly-matching figures on the 
number of emigrants from a particular country of origin and the number of 
immigrants from that country to a particular destination country. However, 
in practice, »emigration numbers reported by sending countries tend to differ 
from the corresponding immigration numbers reported by receiving coun-
tries« (de Beer et al. 2010, p. 459). This divergence is usually quite significant: 
for example, according to Eurostat figures, the UK reported 42,403 immi-
grants from Poland in 2015, while Poland reported only sending 11,682 emi-
grants to the UK.8 Generally, figures on emigration tend to be lower than 
reported immigration events in receiving countries (UNECE 2008), as indi-
viduals usually have little incentive to inform their home country authorities 
about their departure while immigrants may enjoy some benefits from in-
forming authorities in a destination country about their arrival. However, the 
GMFIA simply omits this known weakness of migration statistics by provid-
ing perfectly-matching figures for emigration and immigration. 
What this example illustrates is that knowledge practices enact migration 
in certain ways and that these practices are informed by and carry tacit polit-
ical agendas that affect how migration is enacted as an intelligible object of 
government. Moreover, this example illustrates that the production of 
knowledge is entangled with the production of nonknowledge and that the 
latter also affects the version of migration that is enacted through knowledge 
practices. In sum, the GMFIA highlights that the politics of international 
migration management are intertwined with a politics of (non)knowledge 
–––––––––––– 
8  Figures taken from Eurostat database: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. Ac-
cessed: 22.11.2017. 
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that shape our very understanding of what migration is and whether and 
how it can be governed. 
3 On the Enactment of Migration, Borders,  
and the National Order of Things 
One question raised by the performativity of knowledge practices is how to 
theorize the relationship between the enactment of migration through the 
production of (non)knowledge and the enactment of (some) people as mi-
grants through practices of bordering. Numerous scholars have criticized 
conventional state-centric understandings of migration, which not only natu-
ralize the »national order of things« (Malkki 1995), but also ontologize mi-
grants as readily-available objects of research. The adoption of this »nation-
state point of view« (Favell 2007) in the study of migration ultimately results 
in reducing migration studies to a »migrantology« (Römhild 2017) that reifies 
the common-sense-distinction between (native) citizens and (foreign) mi-
grants (cf. Bojadžijev and Römhild 2014; Dahinden 2016).  
This nation-state point of view is held by conventional definitions of mi-
gration, as a series of linear movements from one nation-state to another. For 
example, the United Nations (UN) defines a migrant as »a person who moves 
to a country other than his or her usual residence for a period of at least a 
year« (UNECE 2015, p. 137). By adopting nationally-bounded, mutually-
exclusive state territories as unquestioned units of analysis in the very 
concept of migration, such state-centric definitions of a migrant render na-
tion-states as passive spatial containers that are crisscrossed by migratory 
movements. What this methodological nationalism obscures are the many 
practices of bordering and boundary-drawing on which nation-states rely to 
reproduce themselves as a demarcated territory, a bounded social group, and 
a sovereign authority. However, it is these very practices of bordering and 
boundary-drawing that enact some people as migrants (for a detailed 
account of this argument, see: Scheel and Tazzioli 2021).  
Again, space only permits me to illustrate this point through one exam-
ple, which concerns the implementation of Schengen visa policies. In general, 
visa policies belong to the oldest and most established techniques of out-
sourcing border controls beyond national demarcation lines. Imposing a visa 
requirement enables authorities to pre-screen and pre-select travelers before 
their departure (Zampagni 2016). In the context of the Schengen visa regime, 
the criteria for imposing a visa requirement on a specific country evaluate its 
population in terms of risks, »relating inter alia to illegal immigration, public 
policy and security« (Council 2001, p. 3). As the global map of the Schengen 
visa regime shows, the partition of the world into ›risky‹ and ›trustworthy‹ 
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populations is informed by colonial legacies, geopolitical asymmetries, and 
profound economic inequalities (Bigo and Guild 2005). 
Figure 3: Official Map of the Schengen Visa Regime  
 
Figure Key: Member states of the Schengen area and associated countries are colored in 
blue. Countries whose citizens do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area are 
colored in green. Countries whose citizens are subject to a visa requirement are colored in 
red. Citizens of countries colored in dark red (i.e., the most significant countries of origin 
of asylum seekers in the EU) also require an airport transit visa.  
Source: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-
policy_en. Accessed 23.3.2020. 
 
For all those subjected to a visa requirement, the decisive controls take place 
at the consulates in their country of residence and thus long before they reach 
the EU’s geopolitical borders. In the application procedure, the presumption 
of innocence is reversed: it is the applicant who must prove in an interview 
and by providing numerous documents that, contrary to the statistical 
knowledge that justifies the imposition of a visa requirement in the first 
place, he/she does not pose a migration or security threat (Bigo and Guild 
2005). In practice, any visa applicant will be denied access to mobility if they 
cannot convince consular staff of their ›will to return‹ to their country of 
departure. If the visa application of an old woman seeking to visit her chil-
dren and grandchildren in Europe is rejected because her intention to »leave 
the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa applied for 
could not be ascertained« (EP and Council, 2009, p. 12; emphasis added), the 
woman is enacted as a migrant by consular staff, even though she has never 
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crossed a geopolitical border. She is denied mobility to her desired destina-
tion because she is suspected of seeking to settle permanently in the EU (In-
fantino and Rea 2012). I speak of ›enacted‹ here to highlight, first, the per-
formative nature of bordering practices and, second, the processual and 
sociomaterial character of the practices through which (some) people are 
constituted as migrants. The practices of consular staff, such as posing ques-
tions about a person’s purpose of stay or verifying the authenticity of docu-
ments, are performative because they bring into being the very subject they 
seek to govern: a migrant. What the consulate example highlights is that 
people are enacted as migrants from the moment that their movement or 
presence clashes with the practices of government that aim to (re-)produce 
the »national order of things« (Malkki 1995).  
However, sites of border encounters like consulates or migration admin-
istrations are not the only instances where some people are enacted as mi-
grants; other sites produce various kinds of data, paper files, and administra-
tive records about people targeted as migrants and other mobile subjects. For 
instance, if a person applies for a Schengen visa, a file including their bio-
metric data will be created in the Visa Information System (VIS) and stored 
for a period of five years. These data are analyzed in reports of the EU’s IT 
agency eu-LISA and may also inform annual risk analyses conducted by 
FRONTEX. In addition, consulates keep lists of approved and rejected appli-
cations for long-term student, business, and family reunification visas, which 
are used for national and European migration statistics. Thus, sites of border 
and migration control do not only enact some people as migrants: they also 
play an important role in the enactment of migration as a knowable, intelligi-
ble object of government. It is here that administrative records and various 
kinds of data are produced that feed into the production of statistics, visuali-
zations, and other knowledge artefacts that in turn inform and shape policy 
discourse and decisions, and thus also practices and logics of border and 
migration management (Takle 2017). What is needed is a better understand-
ing of how this conversion is accomplished in practice—that is, how adminis-
trative records, paper files, and other inscriptions, but also instances of igno-
rance and non-recording, are converted, via a chain of translations and modi-
fications, into knowledge or nonknowledge about migration. Therefore, in 
the following section, I introduce a sociology of translation and treason as an 
approach that enables scholars to trace the often-contested transformation of 
records and data traces on individual migrants into (non)knowledge about 
migration. 
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4 A Sociology of Translation and Treason for Border and 
Migration Studies  
In contrast to realist and representationalist ontologies, a sociology of transla-
tion and treason embraces a ›flat ontology‹ that does not assume a gap be-
tween knowledge and the ›reality‹ to which this knowledge refers. Instead, 
entities are composed and recomposed – i.e., translated – from one situation 
to the next through material-semiotic practices of meaning-making that rely 
on complex, always-shifting sociotechnical networks. These practices result 
in a chain of translations that is, effectively, a chain of references, as »each 
sequence in the process [of translation] refers back to a prior object« (de 
Goede 2017, p. 29). For instance, through a sociology of translation, Bruno 
Latour (1999) traces how samples of soil from the Amazonian basin are col-
lected, marked, made transportable, analyzed in a laboratory with the help of 
various devices and experiments, converted into inscriptions that are debat-
ed, and eventually converted into scientific facts that are published in an 
academic journal. Likewise, Marieke de Goede (2017) engages in a sociology 
of translation to delineate how a commercial transaction in the context of the 
›war on terror‹ is converted from a digital data trace via its algorithmic risk 
assessment and flagging in a report into a sign of suspicion and a (possible) 
evidence of wrongdoing that calls for a security intervention. In the follow-
ing, I show that a sociology of translation can also be used to trace the chains 
of translation through which (some) people are enacted as migrants in border 
encounters and how both the inscriptions and the ignorance produced in 
these encounters are translated into numerical and other kinds of ›facts‹ 
about migration.  
The starting point of an analysis of these chains of translation is located 
in conceptualizing sites of border and migration management – such as con-
sulates, border check posts, or migrant reception centers – as »obligatory 
passage points« (Callon 1986b) through which people have to pass in order 
to move to or stay in a desired place. At these obligatory passage points, as 
administrative distinctions are drawn and decisions are made, (some) mobile 
subjects are translated, through a range of sociomaterial practices – involving 
various assessments, inscription devices, files, tokens of identity, information 
systems, and more – into various kinds of migrants. For instance, at a consu-
late, a person applying for a Schengen visa becomes a visa applicant and, if 
their application is accepted, a tourist or a trusted business traveler. If their 
application is rejected, the person is instead enacted as a (potential) migrant 
and denied access to mobility (as explained above). Likewise, a person is 
enacted as an asylum seeker through the administrative procedures they 
must undergo in order to apply for refugee status. If the person’s application 
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is approved, they become an officially certified refugee; if it is rejected, they 
become an illegalized, deportable migrant – a status they may contest in 
court, leaving them in a state of legal limbo. The crucial point for the argu-
ment of this article is that these encounters between mobile subjects and the 
actors, means, and methods of border and mobility control deployed by na-
tion-states involve the production of data that may be used for the produc-
tion of knowledge about migration. Put differently, the border-related en-
counters that enact some mobile subjects as migrants also involve data prac-
tices through which the subjects in question are translated (with the help of 
various inscription devices) into numerous forms and types of data – such as 
administrative records, digitized datasets, biometric templates, etc. These 
data may be used for the enactment of migration as an intelligible object of 
government through the knowledge practices of quantification, categoriza-
tion, visualization, and so forth. A sociology of translation allows scholars to 
trace and interrogate the multiple processes of translation (and treason) that 
are involved in converting mobile subjects into data and other artefacts of 
knowledge production. 
In brief, a sociology of translation can be characterized as one of the cen-
tral intellectual forerunners of material-semiotic approaches, as described in 
the first section. Like material-semiotic approaches, a sociology of translation 
recognizes any given entity as an effect of complex, constantly-shifting 
sociotechnical networks that comprise both human and non-human ele-
ments. This is what Callon (1986b) emphasizes with the notion of translation: 
entities are always in a process of transformation, as the associations support-
ing them constantly change from one situation to the next. The central task of 
a sociology of translation, then, is to trace how these associations are formed, 
how they change from one situation to the next, and how these changes affect 
the entities enacted by these associations of human and non-human elements.  
Three important points must be noted for such an analysis. First, a soci-
ology of translation embraces what Callon (1986b) calls the »principle of 
generalised symmetry« – that is, the analyst does not only provide the same 
space to human and non-human elements in the analysis but also analyzes 
them with the same terms and methods. In this way, a sociology of transla-
tion seeks to transcend anthropocentric accounts of the world in which 
human beings are treated as the only relevant actors. Instead, a sociology of 
translation enables conceiving of human agency as the effect of complex, 
precarious sociotechnical actor-networks, in which material artefacts act in 
the sense that they ›make do‹ as they enable, constrain, facilitate, and inhibit 
human action in particular ways. Second, a sociology of translation introduc-
es a radically-situated analysis that attends to minor shifts and details in 
order to learn how an entity changes from one situation to the next. This 
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follows from the premise that any change in the relationships among the 
various elements of a network affect the composition of the network as a 
whole and thus also its performative effects. Third, Callon (1986b, p. 196) 
emphasizes that »translation is a process, never a completed accomplish-
ment, and it may fail«. In other words, a successful translation is the precari-
ous and reversible outcome of a labor-intensive, often-contested process that 
allows a network to be represented by a single entity, which acts as a spokes-
person for the network as a whole (Callon 1986a). 
This last point is particularly important in the context of border and 
migration management, where the interests and desires of people targeted as 
migrants often do not coincide with the policy agendas of the actors seeking 
to control and regulate their movements and conduct as well as to produce 
knowledge about them for these purposes. On one side, the actors, means, 
and methods of border and migration management, along with the socio-
technical networks sustaining them, often rely on tactics and ruses involving 
force, coercion, and outward violence to render people targeted as migrants 
knowable and governable. On the other side, people who are enacted, prob-
lematized, and governed as migrants often have ample reason to avoid, 
evade, and subvert practices of registration, regulation, and control, which 
are often at odds with their own interests. Thus, it is particularly important in 
research on borders and migration to take seriously Callon’s (1986a, p. 26) 
observation that »translation […] does not occur without resistance«. As a 
result, inspired by the work of Vasilis Galis and Francis Lee (2014), I propose 
enriching a sociology of translation with a vocabulary of treason in order to 
provide scholars with the conceptual repertoire that is needed to study and 
expose instances of coercion, (epistemic) violence, subversion, struggle, and 
so on, often featured by processes of translation in the context of border and 
migration management. 
Following John Law’s (1997) astute observation that »traduction [transla-
tion] is also trahison [treason]«, Galis and Lee (2014) argue that processes of 
translation – the joining of forces in sociotechnical networks – operate in 
tandem with processes of treason, oppression, and incapacitation aimed at 
the production of weakness and asymmetrical power relations.9 Consequent-
–––––––––––– 
9  John Law (1997) underlines the entanglement of translation and treason to underscore 
that »all representation also betrays its object.« While treason might initially sound like a 
misleading term because it carries the notion of intentional deceit, one should also consider 
that translators are often not aware how their work resembles a particular interpretation of 
the original. Just as translators (or interpreters) have to work with but cannot fully control 
the polyvalences and connotations of the words they use, actors cannot fully control the 
effects of the sociotechnical networks they mobilize and rely on in processes of translation. 
Galis and Lee (2014) add another twist to Law’s take on translation and treason by invoking 
The Politics of (Non)Knowledge in the (Un)Making of Migration ― 57 
ZMF 2021 1 (2): 39–71. 
ly, Galis and Lee (2014, p. 155) propose a vocabulary that is able to »explore 
the dark side of the translation process and the disruption of [alternative] 
actor network[s]«. They suggest distortion, estrangement, rejection, and disrup-
tion as terms indicating moments of treason within processes of translation 
(Galis and Lee, p. 156), although they underline that moments of treason 
constitute »overlapping aspects or layers of a heterogeneous process« rather 
than »chronological phases that historically succeed each other« (Galis and 
Lee, p. 156). Moreover, they follow Callon (1986b, p. 200) by stressing that, as 
in the case of processes of translation, »an infinite number of repertoires [of 
tactics and practices] is possible« when it comes to analyzing instances of 
treason in the forming of sociotechnical networks (Galis and Lee 2014, p. 156).  
In sum, this framework enables studying the processes of translation and 
treason that are involved in the translation of the movements, practices, and 
transactions of subjects enacted as migrants into administrative records, im-
ages, digitized datasets, and other forms of data, which may be used to enact 
migration as an intelligible object of government. In the next section, I mobi-
lize this framework to show, through an example case, how a sociology of 
translation enriched by a vocabulary of treason can help scholars theorize 
and analyze the relationship between the enactment of migration through 
knowledge practices and the enactment of migrants through practices of bor-
dering. This example concerns the phenomenon called the ›deportation gap‹, 
which is often invoked to call for, authorize, and justify the introduction of 
ever-tougher legislation and ever-more repressive measures in the field of 
›return policy‹. 
5 Lost in Translation: Reexamining the ›Deportation Gap‹ 
Since the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe, numerous laws and measures have 
been introduced on both European and national levels to increase the rate of 
returns of deportable migrants. For instance, in March 2017, the European 
Commission (EC) launched a Renewed Action Plan on Returns (EC 2017). On 
the national level, German authorities introduced various measures, includ-
ing deportation detention to prevent deportees from absconding, capture and 
analysis of asylum seekers’ mobile phone data to determine their country of 
––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the notion of treason to highlight instances of force, contestation, struggle, and resistance in 
processes of translation – that is, instances of treason that cannot be reduced to mistransla-
tion as a result of friction, slippage, or failure. Thus, following these careful observations of 
STS scholars, I use ›translation‹ as the generic term for a repertoire of concepts that is need-
ed to account both for instances of breakdown, friction, and slippage within chains of trans-
lation as well as for moments of coercion, contestation, struggle, subversion, and resistance 
in related practices and procedures. 
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origin, and the conclusion of readmission agreements with countries with 
poor human rights records (like Sudan). Many of these measures go back to 
the so-called Law for Better Enforcement of Return from June 2017. However, in 
August 2019, the Second Law for Better Enforcement of Return (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2019) entered into force, highlighting the legal actionism in the 
field of return policy. The crucial point in relation to the following argument 
is that all these laws, and the restrictive measures they introduce, are neces-
sary and justified by the alleged need to reduce the so-called ›deportation 
gap‹. 
As noted in the introduction, the deportation gap refers to the discrepan-
cy between the number of people issued with a return order and the (much 
smaller) number of people who are actually returned or deported (Gibney 
and Hansen 2003). The deportation gap is established on both national and 
European levels by the number of issued return orders juxtaposed with the 
number of officially recorded returns. Thus, the deportation gap relies on 
statistical knowledge about migration. On the European level, the so-called 
›effective return rate‹ – the number of people who are issued a return order 
and who are physically returned to a so-called ›third country‹10 – was ap-
proximately 36% in 2017 (ECRE 2019). If one deducts returns to accession 
countries in the Western Balkans (which accept EU-issued identity papers), 
the effective return rate is even lower – below 30%. Therefore, according to 
these figures, only one in three people legally obligated to leave the EU has 
actually returned to a country outside the Schengen area.  
It is this statistical knowledge concerning the deportation gap that ani-
mates the introduction of ever-more restrictive legislation and highly intru-
sive measures in this contested policy field. For instance, in the context of 
Germany, the first Law for Better Enforcement of Return was justified with the 
following statement: »On 31st January 2017 213.439 deportable migrants11 
resided in Germany, according to Germany’s register of foreigners [Auslän-
derzentralregister, hereafter: AZR]. In the coming months the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees [BAMF] is expected to reject a high number of 
asylum applications of people not in need of protection. The number of non-
returned deportable migrants will thus increase further in 2017. Hence, legis-
lative measures are needed to achieve improvements in the area of returns« 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2017a: 1). However, as the following analysis shows, 
–––––––––––– 
10  In the EU jargon ›third country‹ refers to any country that is not a member of the 
Schengen area. 
11  The people concerned in this law are officially labeled as Ausreisepflichtige. This adminis-
trative category literally translates as ›person obligated to leave the country‹. For reasons of 
clarity, in the following section I translate this rather bulky bureaucratic term as ›deportable 
migrant‹.  
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the deportation gap is, to a significant extent, an effect of authorities’ non-
knowledge about self-organized returns. 
In March 2017 – only two months after the first Law for Better Enforcement 
of Return was passed in the parliament – Frank-Jürgen Weise, Germany’s 
then-Commissioner for Refugee Management, questioned the number of 
213,439 deportable migrants. An internal report issued by Weise’s office was 
leaked to the press: it stressed that »data stored in the AZR often provides 
the basis for important political decisions« before noting that »these data 
show considerable deficits at the moment« (Beauftragter für Flüchtlings-
management 2017, p. 5). In particular, the report criticized »a significant 
number of inconsistent and seemingly implausible datasets« about deporta-
ble migrants (Beauftragter für Flüchtlingsmanagement 2017, p. 8), and it 
emphasized that these data »lead to a biased debate on how to deal with 
[non-returned] deportable migrants and the need for respective political 
measures« (Beauftragter für Flüchtlingsmanagement 2017, p. 5; on this point 
see also: Deutscher Bundestag 2017b; Ludwig 2019). The following analysis 
focuses on one group of people that the report cites as a possible source for 
inflated numbers in the AZR on non-returned deportable migrants: people 
who may have already long left the Schengen area but did not notify German 
authorities about their departure.12 
This group is quite significant in numerical terms. In 2015, the opposition 
inquired why there were so many deportable migrants without a toleration 
(Duldung)13 registered in the AZR, despite the legal requirement to either 
immediately return a deportable migrant or to issue that person a toleration. 
At the beginning of 2015, 40,970 people were registered in the AZR. Of these 
people, 12,950 received benefits under the Asylum Seeker Support Law 
(Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz), indicating that they had not left Germany 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2015, p. 74). Regarding the remaining 28,000 people, 
the government responded: »It can be assumed that a not insignificant num-
ber of deportable migrants without a toleration have either absconded or left 
Germany without foreigners’ offices’ knowledge. Probably, these cases are 
–––––––––––– 
12  Other groups of people are also registered as deportable in the AZR but for which the 
data held in the AZR is considered implausible. The report from Weise’s office highlights, 
for instance, that 20.4% of people registered as deportable in the AZR are asylum seekers 
whose cases are still pending (Beauftragter für Flüchtlingsmanagement 2017). These data 
can certainly also be analyzed in terms of a sociology of translation and treason. However, 
within the scope of this article, I can only focus on one case for illustrative purposes. 
13  In § 60 of Germany’s residency law, a toleration (Duldung) is defined as a »temporary 
suspension of the deportation«. A toleration is not a residence title and does not offer a right 
to remain in Germany. Migrants issued with a toleration are still legally obligated to leave 
Germany; in practice, however, many migrants live in Germany for years with a repeatedly 
renewed toleration. 
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not always pursued by foreigners’ offices in charge so that relevant notifica-
tions (e.g. ›place of residence unknown‹) are either entered with delay in the 
AZR or not entered at all. The consequence would be that such people would 
still be registered as ›deportable without toleration‹ in the AZR« (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2015, p. 74, author’s translation). 
If one thinks about these datasets and the people to which they refer in 
terms of a sociology of translation and treason, one could say that an un-
known number of deportable migrants has been ›lost in translation‹. This 
rather counterintuitive observation becomes understandable if one considers 
what is expected of deportable migrants who wish to inform German author-
ities about their departure. A person legally obligated to leave Germany is 
issued a return order, an official document specifying a date by which the 
person concerned is legally required to leave Germany at the latest. In addi-
tion, a second document, a so-called ›border-crossing confirmation‹ (Grenz-
übertrittsbescheinigung, hereafter: GÜB), is issued to the person concerned.14 
To be registered as a re-emigrated migrant in the AZR, deportable migrants 
must have their GÜB signed and stamped at the border-crossing point they 
use to leave Germany. The lower part of the GÜB is kept by the border 
guard, who has to sign, stamp, and post the document back to the foreigners’ 
office that issued the return order (see the image of a sample GÜB below). 
The caseworker in the foreigners’ office then has to scan the GÜB, add it to 
the person’s digital file, and register the person concerned as a returned mi-
grant in the AZR. Only if all these steps are completed will the person con-
cerned be translated into an administrative record that will feature as a rec-
orded re-migration event in the official migration statistics and thus used in 
calculations of effective return rates.  
In terms of a sociology of translation, the lower part of the GÜB has to be 
translated into a »spokesperson« (Callon 1986a) for the returning migrant. 
However, as just noted, a successful translation hinges on the enactment of a 
chain of references through sociomaterial practices: only if the lower part of 
the GÜB is signed and stamped by a border guard, then put in an envelope 
and sent to one of the more than 600 foreigners’ offices in Germany that issue 
return orders, will the GÜB act as spokesperson for the migrant concerned. In 
this case, the GÜB informs caseworkers in charge of the case about the per-
son’s return: ›Yes, Mr. Y or Ms. X has actually followed your return order 
and left Germany via this particular border crossing point on this particular 
–––––––––––– 
14  It should be noted that the border-crossing confirmation is not mentioned in German 
Residency Law (see § 50 in German Residency Law concerning the ›Obligation to Leave‹ 
[§ 50 Ausreisepflicht]). Consequently, no standardized format for a GÜB exists; rather, each 
foreigners‘ office uses its own template. 
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Figure 4: Example for a border-crossing confirmation, with instructions 
of how to return it to authorities 
 
Source: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grenz%C3%BCbertrittsbescheinigung. Accessed: 
20.6.2020. 
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day‹. Moreover, only if the busy caseworker remembers – after a long and 
busy working day – to scan the GÜB, add it to the person’s digital file, and 
create an entry about the person’s departure in the AZR will the GÜB suc-
cessfully act as a stand-in for the return of the person concerned. Only if all 
these conditions are met and all these associations and chains of references 
are formed will the GÜB become a digital record that is eventually translated 
into an emigration event in official migration statistics. In this way, the GÜB 
becomes a signifier of a return-event of a deportable migrant that eventually 
increases the rate of effective returns cited in policy documents like the EC’s 
(2017) Renewed Action Plan on Returns. 
However, as the German government conceded in its reply to the par-
liamentary inquiry (see above), the processes sustaining the translation of 
deportable migrants into officially returned migrants are, in many instances, 
fraught with friction, disrupted, or actively subverted. This occurs when the 
sociotechnical networks sustaining them do not hold. One important source 
for instances of friction, slippage, and treason concerns the return of the 
GÜB. If returning migrants travel directly by plane from Germany to their 
country of origin, it is relatively easy for them to return the lower part of the 
GÜB to a member of the German border police at the airport and to follow 
the established procedure outlined above. However, Germany is surrounded 
by other Schengen member states; consequently, there are no border check-
points at Germany’s land borders where returning migrants can have their 
GÜB signed, stamped, and sent back to the issuing foreigners’ office. Since 
border guards of other Schengen member states are not required to deal with 
paperwork of the German state, and since migrants could easily re-enter 
Germany from another Schengen member state due to the absence of border 
controls, migrants cannot return their GÜB when leaving Germany if they do 
so via a land border or if they take a connecting flight through another 
Schengen member state.  
In these cases, deportable migrants are asked to bring their GÜB to the 
nearest German consulate in their country of origin after their return.15 How-
ever, it is reasonable to assume that many migrants do not follow this re-
quest. Given that German consulates are usually overcrowded, that the 
nearest German consulate may be hundreds of kilometers away from the 
migrants’ new place of residence, and that the booking of an appointment 
often involves hefty fees, it is quite likely that many returned migrants decide 
to pay no heed to their GÜB. In these cases, migrants have left Germany but 
–––––––––––– 
15  On this point, see section 50.4.1.2 of the comment on § 50 of the German Residency Law 
on the webpage Migrationsrecht.net: https://www.migrationsrecht.net/component/com_joo
mlaw/Itemid,232/id,286/layout,vwv/view,comment/. Accessed: 20.6.2020. 
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they continue to be registered as a deportable, non-returned migrant in the 
AZR, thus contributing to a low rate of effective returns and a widening de-
portation gap. This occurs because these migrants have literally been lost in 
translation.  
However, it would be too easy to only attribute these mistranslations to 
instances of friction and failure that result from a somewhat-outdated meth-
od for recording return migration events. The partial non-recording of self-
organized return migration is also, to a certain extent, an effect of the recalci-
trance of deportable migrants, who may see little reason to satisfy the admin-
istrative needs of an exclusionary migration regime that disrupted their lives 
and projects in Germany. This ›sweet revenge‹ is complemented by another 
instance of treason: a tactic of subversion by which visa overstayers can by-
pass laws stipulating fines for illegal stay in a particular member state.16 Since 
no coordinated sanctions for visa overstayers exist on the EU level, national 
authorities are only authorized to enforce laws on illegal stay with respect to 
their own jurisdiction. Thus, overstayers can avoid fines imposed by the 
national laws of the member state that issued their visa by leaving the 
Schengen area via another Schengen member state (EU Council 2015).17 In the 
case of previous encounters with German authorities, this tactic contributes 
to the unknown number of non-recorded return events, a form of non-
knowledge that (somewhat ironically) is translated, via calculations of the 
rate of effective returns on the basis of AZR data, into statistical knowledge 
about a growing deportation gap, leading to calls for tougher measures in the 
field of return policy.  
In brief, numerous forces, factors, and sources are responsible for the 
non-recording and mistranslation of many instances of return migration. 
Taken together, the manifold webs of practices of translation and treason 
involved in the enactment of the deportation gap illustrate how the politics of 
international migration management are entangled with a politics of 
–––––––––––– 
16  According to § 95 of the German Residency Law, illegal stay in Germany constitutes a 
crime that is subject to fines or imprisonment of up to one year.  
17  I was able to observe firsthand this return practice of visa overstayers during fieldwork 
at a large international airport in the Schengen area in 2012. In 2015, border control authori-
ties tried to produce knowledge about the scope and practicalities of this tactic on a Euro-
pean level, in order to assess (and push for) the need for legislative action on the EU level. 
To this end, operation Amberlight was initiated under the Latvian presidency of the EU 
Council. During a two-week period of study at 34 European airports, 1,344 overstayers 
were recorded exiting via a different member state than the one that had issued the visa. 
The final report of operation Amberlight – with its maps, charts, numerical facts, and policy 
recommendations – can also be read as the result of numerous chains of translations (Latvi-
an Presidency 2015). 
64 ― Stephan Scheel 
ZMF 2021 1 (2): 39–71. 
(non)knowledge that proves to be decisive in the (un)making of migration as 
an object of government. 
6 Conclusion  
The tracing of chains of references and related processes of translation that 
convert records of border crossings into statistical knowledge about return 
migration illustrates how migration is enacted in multiple, contingent, and at 
times conflicting ways, as an intelligible reality with specific features. These 
features – like the divergence between the number of return orders and the 
official count of returned migrants – raise particular problematizations of 
government, such as the deportation gap. Consequently, the analysis above 
demonstrates the potential of a sociology of translation and treason to 
investigate how practices of bordering feature in the production of 
(non)knowledge about migration, as well as how the latter informs and 
shapes the formulation of migration policies and, consequently, specific 
logics and practices of border and migration management.  
With regard to the deportation gap, the second dimension of this ques-
tion becomes evident in a study conducted by the consultant company 
McKinsey. At the height of the ›migration crisis‹ in 2015, the BAMF paid 
nearly 2 million euro to the consultancy company to prepare a study on de-
portation obstacles and how to address them. Based on AZR data, the study 
projected that the number of deportable migrants would significantly in-
crease in the coming years, claiming that  
»the total number of deportable migrants will increase significantly in view of the high 
number of pending asylum claims (about 580.000 in September 2016), the number of 
expected asylum claims for 2017 and the relatively low number of returns (85.000 in 
2016 and forecasted for 2017). […] this is likely to result in an increase of the number 
of deportable migrants in Germany to ca. 485.000 by the end of 2017. […] In compari-
son to 2016, this would require a seven-fold increase of returns, if all deportable mi-
grants should be returned by the end of 2017« (BAMF 2016, p. 9; passage in bold 
adopted from the original).  
It is precisely this claimed need for legislative action and more effective 
measures in the policy field of return, derived from these figures and related 
projections, that is used to justify a call for more restrictive laws and 
measures. This justification is illustrated by the quote from the preamble of 
the First Law for Better Enforcement of Returns, cited in the previous section.18  
–––––––––––– 
18  An earlier version of the law actually quoted the questionable estimate of 485,000 de-
portable migrants by the end of 2017 from the McKinsey study. According to a parliamen-
tary inquiry of the party Die Linke, however, the official number of deportable migrants was 
much lower at the end of 2017, at 228,859 people (Deutscher Bundestag 2018, p. 77). 
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The analysis in this article shows that the deportation gap is, to a certain 
extent, a statistical chimera, resulting from – among other things – the non-
recording of self-organized return migration. However, the limited existing 
knowledge about the unknown number of deportable migrants leaving Ger-
many without the authorities knowing is ignored by the McKinsey study and 
translated into nonknowledge that informs statistical knowledge about an 
allegedly growing deportation gap. This has very real consequences for the 
people concerned: among others, the First Law for Better Enforcement of Re-
turns authorizes the police to conduct unannounced raids at night and to 
impose detention on migrants who do not cooperate with authorities in es-
tablishing their identity and country of origin in deportation procedures. 
What is underscored by the above analysis is the irreducibly political na-
ture of the production of (non)knowledge about migration. Such politics of 
(non)knowledge in the (un)making of migration consist of at least three di-
mensions. First, both knowledge production and the interrelated production 
of nonknowledge shape how migration is enacted as an intelligible, actiona-
ble object of government. In this way, knowledge practices – and the versions 
of migration they enact – inform and configure particular logics and practices 
of border and migration management. The second, related dimension con-
cerns the tactics and practices migrants deploy to evade, resist, or subvert 
governments’ attempts to accumulate knowledge about them. Precisely be-
cause they are often enacted as a problematic population group requiring 
political intervention, migrants often have ample reason to refuse to be 
known, or at least to be known in this way, and to counteract the means and 
methods of knowledge production. After a recent count of the homeless 
population in Berlin in spring 2020, aid organizations argued that many 
homeless people with citizenship of another EU member state may have 
evaded the enumeration due to fears of being stripped of their right to free-
dom of movement as EU citizens and deported—a practice that has gained 
momentum across EU member states in recent years (Memarnia 2020). Such 
practices of evasion and resistance constitute an important but often over-
looked aspect of migrants’ struggles. 
The third dimension concerns the performativity of knowledge practices. 
If different knowledge practices – that is, different methods of counting, cat-
egorizing, sorting, representing, narrating, data cleaning, visualizing, etc. – 
enact different versions of migration (that is, different versions of the reality), 
then knowledge production about migration constitutes an inherently politi-
cal activity. This is because »ontological multiplicity lays bare […] the per-
manent possibility of alternative configurations« (Mol 2002, p. 164). Thus, 
taking the performativity of knowledge practices seriously underscores 
scholars’ responsibility for the (non)knowledge they produce and dissemi-
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nate about migration (cf. Garelli and Tazzioli 2013; Scheel et. al. 2019; Stierl 
2020). Indeed, migration studies scholars emerge as important stakeholders 
in the »politics of international migration management« (Geiger and Pécoud 
2010), since the knowledge they produce modulates how migration is enact-
ed as a reality, with particular features inviting certain interventions of gov-
ernment. The responsibility and answerability of migration studies scholars 
for the knowledge they produce resides in their capacity not only to expose 
alternative or conflicting enactments of migration but also to participate in 
alternative enactments of migration, where previous enactments do not yet 
exist. If and how a scholar makes use of this capacity affects their identity as 
a migration studies scholar. Ultimately, a sociology of translation and treason 
presents the challenge to engage in knowledge practices that enable enacting 
migration in ways that are less securitizing, commodifying and victimizing 
than the versions of migration with which we are currently confronted. 
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